The Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom by Goldstern, Martin & Shelah, Saharon
ar
X
iv
:m
at
h/
95
01
22
2v
1 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  1
5 J
an
 19
95
The Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom
Revised version, January 1994
Martin GOLDSTERN1
Free University of Berlin
Saharon SHELAH1,2
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
ABSTRACT. The bounded proper forcing axiom BPFA is the
statement that for any family of ℵ1 many maximal antichains
of a proper forcing notion, each of size ℵ1, there is a directed
set meeting all these antichains.
A regular cardinal κ is called Σ1-reflecting, if for any regular
cardinal χ, for all formulas ϕ, “H(χ) |= ‘ϕ’ ” implies “∃δ<κ,
H(δ) |= ‘ϕ’ ”
We show that BPFA is equivalent to the statement that two
nonisomorphic models of size ℵ1 cannot be made isomorphic
by a proper forcing notion, and we show that the consistency
strength of the bounded proper forcing axiom is exactly the
existence of a Σ1-reflecting cardinal (which is less than the ex-
istence of a Mahlo cardinal).
We also show that the question of the existence of isomorphisms
between two structures can be reduced to the question of rigid-
ity of a structure.
1 The authors thank the DFG (grant Ko 490/7-1) and the Edmund Landau Center for
research in Mathematical Analysis, supported by the Minerva Foundation (Germany)
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Introduction
The proper forcing axiom has been successfully employed to decide many questions in set-
theoretic topology and infinite combinatorics. See [Ba1] for some applications, and [Sh b]
and [Sh f] for variants.
In the recent paper [Fu], Fuchino investigated the following two consequences of the proper
forcing axiom:
(a) If a structure A of size ℵ1 cannot be embedded into a structure B, then such
an embedding cannot be produced by a proper forcing notion.
(b) If two structures A and B are not isomorphic, then they cannot be made
isomorphic by a proper forcing notion.
He showed that (a) is in fact equivalent to the proper forcing axiom, and asked if the same
is true for (b).
In this paper we find a natural weakening of the proper forcing axiom, the “bounded”
proper forcing axiom and show that it is equivalent to property (b) above.
We then investigate the consistency strength of this new axiom. While the exact consis-
tency strength of the proper forcing axiom is still unknown (but large, see [To]), it turns out
that the bounded proper forcing axiom is equiconsistent to a rather small large cardinal.
For notational simplicity we will, for the moment, only consider forcing notions which are
complete Boolean algebras. See 0.4 and 4.6.
We begin by recalling the forcing axiom in its usual form: For a forcing notion P , FA(P, κ)
is the following statement:
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Whenever 〈Ai : i < κ〉 is a family of maximal antichains of P , then there is a
filter G∗ ⊆ P meeting all Ai.
If f˜ is a P -name for a function from κ to the ordinals, we will say that G
∗ ⊆ P decides f˜ if
for each i < κ there is a condition p ∈ G∗ and an ordinal αi such that p ‖− f˜(i) = αi. (If
G∗ is directed, then this ordinal must be unique, and we will write f˜[G
∗] for the function
i 7→ αi.) Now it is easy to see that the FA(P, κ) is equivalent to the following statement:
Whenever f˜ is a P -name for a function from κ to the ordinals, then there is a
filter G∗ ⊆ P which decides f˜.
This characterization suggests the following weakening of the forcing axiom:
0.1 Definition: Let P be a forcing notion, and let κ and λ be infinite cardinals.
BFA(P, κ, λ) is the following statement: Whenever f˜ is a P -name for a function
from κ to λ then there is a filter G∗ ⊆ P which decides f˜, or equivalently:
Whenever 〈Ai : i < κ〉 is a family of maximal antichains of P , each of size ≤ λ,
then there is a filter G ⊆ P which meets all Ai.
0.2 Notation:
(1) BFA(P, λ) is BFA(P, λ, λ), and BFA(P ) is BFA(P, ω1).
(2) If E is a class or property of forcing notions, we write BFA(E) for ∀P∈E BFA(P ),
etc.
(3) BPFA = the bounded proper forcing axiom = BFA(proper).
0.3 Remark: For the class of ccc forcing notions we get nothing new: BFA(ccc, λ) is
equivalent to Martin’s axiom MA(λ), i.e., FA(ccc, λ). –· ·✐0.3
0.4 Remark: If the forcing notion P is not a complete Boolean algebra but an arbitrary
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poset, then it is possible that P does not have any small antichains, so it could satisfy the
second version of BFA(P ) vacuously. The problem with the first definition, when applied
to an arbitrary poset, is that a filter on ro(P ) which interprets the P -name (=ro(P )-name)
f˜ does not necessarily generate a filter on P . So for the moment our official definition of
BFA(P ) for arbitrary posets P will be
BFA(P ) :⇐⇒ BFA(ro(P ))
In 4.4 and 4.5 we will find a equivalent (and more natural?) definition BFA′(P ) which does
not explicitly refer to ro(P ).
Contents of the paper: in section 1 we show that the “bounded forcing axiom” for any
forcing notion P is equivalent to Fuchino’s “potential isomorphism” axiom for P . In section
2 we define the concept of a Σ1-reflecting cardinal, and we show that from a model with
such a cardinal we can produce a model for the bounded proper forcing axiom. In section 3
we describe a (known) forcing notion which we will use in section 4, where we complement
our consistency result by showing that a Σ1-reflecting cardinal is necessary: If BPFA holds,
then ℵ2 must be Σ1-reflecting in L.
Notation: We use ⌣· ·✐ to denote the end of a proof, and we write –· ·✐ when we leave a
proof to the reader.
We will use gothic letters A, B, M, . . . for structures (=models of a first order language),
and the corresponding latin letters A, B, M , . . . for the underlying universes. Thus, a
model A will have the universe A, and if A′ ⊆ A then we let A′ be the submodel (possibly
with partial functions) with universe A′, etc.
3
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1. Fuchino’s problem and other applications
Let E be a class of forcing notions.
1.1 Definition: Let A and B be two structures for the same first order language, and
let E be a class (or property) of forcing notions. We say that A and B are E-potentially
isomorphic (A ≃E B) iff there is a forcing P ∈ E such that ‖−P “A ≃ B.” A ≃P B means
A ≃{P} B.
1.2 Definition: We say that a structure A is nonrigid, if it admits a nontrivial automor-
phism. We say that A is E-potentially nonrigid, if there is a forcing notion P ∈ E , ‖−P “A
is nonrigid”.
1.3 Definition:
(1) PI(E , λ) is the statement: Any two E-potentially isomorphic structures of size
λ are isomorphic.
(2) PA(E , λ) is the statement: Any E-potentially nonrigid structure of size λ is
nonrigid.
PI(E , λ) was defined by Fuchino [Fu]. It is clear that
FA(E , λ) =⇒ BFA(E , λ) =⇒ PI(E , λ)&PA(E , λ)
for all E , and Fuchino asked if PI(E , λ) implies FA(E , λ), in particular for the cases E=ccc,
E=proper and E=stationary-preserving.
We will show in this section that the the three statments BFA, PA and PI are in fact
equivalent. Hence in particular PI(ccc, λ) is equivalent to MA(λ).
In the next sections we will show that for E=proper, the first implication cannot be re-
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versed, by computing the exact consistency strength of BPFA and comparing it to the
known lower bounds for the consistency strength of PFA.
1.4 Theorem: For any forcing notion P and for any λ, the following are equivalent:
PI(P, λ)
PA(P, λ)
BFA(P, λ)
Proof of PI ⇒ PA: This follows from theorem 1.13 below. Here we will give a shorter
proof under the additional assumption that we have not only PI(P ) but also PI(Pp) for all
p ∈ P , where Pp is the set of all elements of P which are stronger that p:
Let M be a potentially nonrigid structure. So there is a a P -name f˜ such that
‖−P “f˜ is a nontrivial automorphism of M”
We can find a condition p ∈ P and two elements a 6= b of M such that
p ‖−P “f˜(a) = b”
Since we can replace P by Pp, we may assume that p is the weakest condition of P . So we
have that (M, a) and (M, b) are potentially isomorphic. Any isomorphism from (M, a) to
(M, b) is an automorphism of M mapping a to b, so we are done. ⌣· ·✐PI⇒PA
We will now describe the framework of the proof of the second part of our theorem: PA⇒
BFA. We start with a forcing notion P . Recall that (for the moment) all our forcing notions
are a complete Boolean algebras. Fix a small family of small antichains. Our structure will
consist of a disjoint union of the free groups generated by the antichains. On each of the
free groups the translation by an element of the corresponding antichain will be a nontrivial
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automorphism, and if all these translating elements are selected from the antichains by a
directed set, then the union of these automorphisms will be an automorphism of the whole
structure. We will also ensure that “essentially” these are the only automorphisms, so
every automorphism will define a sufficiently generic set.
1.5 Definition: For any set X let F (X) be the free group on the generators X , and for
w ∈ F (X) define supp(w) =
⋂
{Y ⊆ X : w ∈ 〈Y 〉}, i.e. supp(w) is the set of elements x
of X which occur (as x or as x−1) in the reduced representation of w. (If you prefer, you
can change the proof below by using the free abelian group generated by X instead of the
free group, or the free abelian group of order 2, . . . ).
1.6 Setup: Let P be a complete Boolean algebra, and let (Ai : i ∈ I) be a system of λ
many maximal antichains of size λ. We may assume that this is a directed system, i.e., for
any i, j ∈ I there is a k ∈ I such that Ak refines both Ai and Aj . So if we write i < j for
“Aj refines Ai”, (I, <) becomes a partially ordered upwards directed set. (We say that A
refines B if each element of A is stronger than some unique element of B, or in the Boolean
sense if there is a partition A =
⋃
b∈B
Ab of the set A satisfying ∀b ∈ B
∑
a∈Ab
a = b.)
Assuming PA(P, λ), we will find a filter(base) meeting all the sets Ai.
1.7 Definition:
(a) Let (Fi, ∗) be the free group generated by Ai, and let M be the disjoint union
of the sets Fi.
(b) For i ∈ I, z ∈ Fi let
Ri,z = {(y, z ∗ y) : y ∈ Fi}
(c) If i < j, then there is a “projection” function hji from Aj to Ai: For p ∈ Aj ,
6
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hji (p) is the unique element of Ai which is compatible with (and in fact weaker
than) p. hji extends to a unique homomorphism from Fj to Fi, which we will
also call hji .
1.8 Fact: (1) The functions hji commute, i.e., if i < j < k then h
k
i = h
j
i ◦ h
k
j .
(2) If i < j, p ∈ Aj, then p is stronger than h
j
i (p). –· ·✐1.8
Now let M = (M, (Fi)i∈I , (Ri,z)i∈I,z∈Fi , (h
j
i )i∈I,j∈I,i<j), where we treat all sets Fi, Ri,z,
hji as relations on M .
1.9 Definition: Let G ⊆ P be a filter which meets all the sets Ai, say G∩Ai = {yi(G)}.
Define fG :M →M as follows: If x ∈ Fi, then fG(x) = x ∗ yi(G) (here ∗ = ∗i is the group
operation on Fi).
1.10 Fact: If G is a filter which meets all sets Ai, then fG is an automorphism of M
without fixpoints.
Proof: It is clear that the sets Fi and the relations Ri,z are preserved. Note that for
i < j we have hji (yj) = yi, since yi and yj are compatible. Since the functions h
j
i are
homomorphisms, we have hji (fG(x)) = h
j
i (x ∗ yj) = h
j
i (x) ∗ yi = fG(h
j
i (x)), so also h
j
i is
preserved. ⌣· ·✐1.10
So M is potentially nonrigid. So by PA(P, λ) we know that M is really nonrigid.
Finally we will show how a nontrivial automorphism of M defines a filter G∗ meeting all
the sets Ai.
So let F be an automorphism. Let 1i be the neutral element of Fi, and assume F (1i) = wi.
Since the sets Fi are predicates in our structure, we must have wi ∈ Fi. Using the predicates
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hji we can show: If i < j, then h
j
i (wj) = wi, and using the predicates Ri,z we can show
that for all z ∈ Fi we must have F (z) = z ∗ wi.
Therefore, as F is not the identity, we can find i∗ ∈ I such that wi∗ 6= 1i∗ . From now on
we will work only with I∗ = {i ∈ I : i∗ ≤ i}. Since every antichain Ai is refined by some
antichain Aj with j ∈ I
∗ it is enough to find a directed set which meets all antichains Aj
for j ∈ I∗.
Let ui = supp(wi). So for all i ∈ I
∗ the set ui is finite and nonempty (since h
i
i∗ [ui] ⊇ ui∗ 6=
∅).
1.11 Fact:
(1) If J ⊆ I∗ is a finite set, then there is a family {pi : i ∈ J} such that
(a) for all i ∈ J : pi ∈ ui
(b) for all i, j ∈ J : If i < j, then hji (pj) = pi.
(2) There is a family {pi : i ∈ I
∗} such that
(a) for all i ∈ I∗: pi ∈ ui
(b) for all i, j ∈ I∗: If i < j, then hji (pj) = pi.
(3) If {pi : i ∈ I
∗} is as in (2), then this set generates a filter which will meet all
sets Ai.
Proof of (1): As I∗ is directed, we can find an upper bound j for J . Let p be an element
of wj such that pi := h
j
i (pj) ∈ wi for all i ∈ J .
(2) follows from (1), by the compactness theorem of propositional calculus. (Recall that
all sets ui are finite.)
(3): We have to show that for any i1, i2 ∈ I
∗ the conditions pi1 and pi2 are compatible,
8
Goldstern–Shelah: Forcing Axioms with Small Antichains
i.e., have a common extension. Let j be an upper bound of i1 and i2. Then pj witnesses
that pi1 and pi2 are compatible, as h
j
i1
(pj) = pi1 and h
j
i2
(pj) = pi2 . ⌣· ·✐1.11 ⌣· ·✐1.4 .
For the theorem 1.13 below we need the following definitions.
1.12 Definition: A tree on a set X is a nonempty set T of finite sequences of elements of
X which is closed under restrictions, i.e., if η : k → X is in T and i < k, then also η↾i ∈ T .
The tree ordering ≤T is given be the subset (or extension) relation: η ≤ ν iff η ⊆ ν iff
∃i : η = ν↾i.
For η ∈ T let SucT (η) := {x ∈ X : η
⌢x ∈ T}.
For A ⊆ T , η ∈ T we let rk(η, A) be the rank of η with respect to A, i.e., the rank of the
(inverse) tree ordering on the set
{ν : η ≤ ν ∈ T, ∀ν′ : η ≤ ν′ < ν ⇒ ν′ /∈ A}
In other words, rk(η, A) = 0 iff η ∈ A, rk(η, A) = ∞ iff there is an infinite branch of T
starting at η which avoids A, and rk(η, A) = sup{rk(ν, A) + 1 : ν a direct successor of η}
otherwise.
1.13 Theorem: For any two structures A and B there is a structure C = C(A,B) such
that in any extension V ′ ⊇ V of the universe, V ′ |= “A ≃ B ↔ C is not rigid.”
Proof: Wlog |A| ≤ |B|. Also wlog A and B are structures in a purely relational language
L, and we may also assume that A ∩B = ∅.
We will say that a tree T on A ∪B “codes A” iff
(1) SucT (η) ∈ {A,B} for all η ∈ T .
(2) Letting TA := {η ∈ T : SucT (η) = A}, the ranks rk(η, T
A) are < ∞ for all
9
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η ∈ T .
(3) The function η 7→ rk(η, TA \ {η}) is 1-1 on TA.
Such a tree can be constructed inductively as T =
⋃
n Tn, where the Tn are well-founded
trees, each Tn+1 end-extends Tn, and all nodes in Tn+1 − Tn are from B except those at
the top (i.e., those whose immediate successors will be in Tn+2 − Tn+1). Because we have
complete freedom in what the rank of the tree ordering for each connected component of
Tn+1 − Tn should be (and because all the Tn have size = |B|), we can arrange to satisfy
(1), (2) and (3).
Moreover, we can find trees T0 and T1, both coding A, such that
(4) SucT0(∅) = A, SucT1(∅) = B.
We will replace the roots (∅) of the trees T0 and T1 by some new and distinct objects ∅0
and ∅1. So the trees T0 and T1 will be disjoint (by (4)).
Now define the structure C as follows: We let C = T0 ∪ T1.
The underlying language of C will be the language L plus an additional binary relation
symbol ≤, which is to be interpreted as the tree order. Whenever R is an n-ary relation
in the language L, we interpret R in C by
RC := {(η⌢a1, . . . , η
⌢an) : η ∈ T0 ∪ T1, and
Suc(η) = A ⇒ (a1, . . . , an) ∈ R
A,
Suc(η) = B ⇒ (a1, . . . , an) ∈ R
B }
Now work in any extension V ′ ⊇ V . First assume that f : A→ B is an isomorphism. We
will define a map g : T0 → T1 such that the map g ∪ g
−1 is a (nontrivial) automorphism
of C.
10
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g is defined inductively as follows:
(a) g(∅0) = ∅1.
(b) If SucT0(η) = SucT1(g(η)), then g(η
⌢a) = g(η)⌢a.
(c) Otherwise, g(η⌢a) = g(η)⌢f(a) or g(η⌢a) = g(η)⌢f−1(a), as appropriate.
It is easy to see that g ∪ g−1 will then be a nontrivial automorphism.
Now assume conversely that g : C→ C is a nontrivial automorphism. Recall that the tree
ordering is a relation on the structure C, so it must be respected by g.
First assume that there are i, j ∈ {0, 1} and an η such that
(∗) η ∈ Ti g(η) ∈ Tj SucTi(η) 6= SucTj (g(η))
So without loss of generality SucTi(η) = A and SucTj (g(η)) = B. Now define a map
f : A→ B by requiring
g(η⌢a) = g(η)⌢f(a)
and check that f must be an isomorphism.
Now we show that we can always find i, j, η as in (∗). If not, then we can first see that
g respects T0 and T1, i.e., g(η) ∈ T0 iff η ∈ T0. Next, our assumption implies that the
functions g↾T0 respect the sets T
A
0 , i.e., η ∈ T
A
0 iff g(η) ∈ T
A
0 . Hence for all η ∈ T
A
0 ,
rk(η, TA0 ) = rk(g(η), T
A
0 ), so (by condition (3) above) g(η) = η for all η ∈ T
A
0 . Since every
ν ∈ T0 can be extended to some η ∈ T
A
0 and g respects <, we must have g(ν) = ν for all
ν ∈ T0. The same argument shows that also g↾T1 is the identity. ⌣· ·✐1.13
1.14 Remarks on other applications: Which other consequences of PFA (see, e.g.,
[Ba1]) are already implied by BPFA? On the one hand it is clear that if PFA is only
11
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needed to produce a sufficiently generic function from ω1 to ω1, then the same proof
should show that BPFA is a sufficient assumption. For example:
BPFA implies “all ℵ1-dense sets of reals are isomorphic.”
On the other hand, as we will see in the next section, the consistency strength of BPFA
is quite weak. So BPFA cannot imply any statement which needs large cardinals, such as
“there is an Aronszajn tree on ℵ2.” In particular, BPFA does not imply PFA.
We do not know if BPFA already decides the size of the continuum, but Woodin has
remarked that the bounded semiproper forcing axiom implies 2ℵ0 = ℵ2.
2. The consistency of BPFA
2.1 Definition: For any cardinal χ, H(χ) is the collection of sets which are hereditarily
of cardinality < χ: Letting trcl(x) be the transitive closure of x, trcl(x) = {x} ∪
⋃
x ∪
⋃⋃
x ∪ · · ·, we have
H(χ) = {x : |trcl(x)| < χ}
(Usually we require χ to be regular)
2.2 Definition: Let κ be an regular cardinal. We say that κ is “reflecting” or more
precisely, Σ1-reflecting, if:
For any first order formula ϕ in the language of set theory, for any a ∈ H(κ):
IF there exists a regular cardinal χ ≥ κ such that H(χ) |= ϕ(a)
THEN there is a cardinal δ < κ such that a ∈ H(δ) and H(δ) |= ϕ(a).
2.3 Remark: (1) We may require δ to be regular without changing the concept of “Σ1-
reflecting”.
12
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(2) We can replace “for all χ” by “for unboundedly many χ”
Proof: (1) Assume that H(χ) |= ϕ(a), χ regular. Choose some large enough χ1 such that
H(χ) ∈ H(χ1), χ1 a successor cardinal. So H(χ1) |= “∃χ , χ regular, H(χ) exists and
H(χ) |= ‘ϕ(a)’ ”. We can find a (successor) δ1 < κ such that H(δ1) |= “∃δ , δ regular,
H(δ) |= ‘ϕ(a)’ ” So δ is really regular.
(2): If χ < χ1 then H(χ) |= “ϕ” iff H(χ1) |= “H(χ) |= ‘ϕ’ ”. ⌣· ·✐2.3
2.4 Remark: It is easy to see that if κ is reflecting, then κ is a strong limit, hence
inaccessible. Applying Σ1 reflection, we get that κ is hyperinaccessible, etc. –· ·✐2.4
2.5 Remark: (1) There is a closed unbounded class C of cardinals such that every regular
κ ∈ C (if there are any) is Σ1 reflecting. So if “∞ is Mahlo”, then there are many Σ1-
reflecting cardinals.
(2) If κ is reflecting, then L |= “κ is reflecting”.
Proof: (1) For any set a and any formula ϕ let f ′(a, ϕ) = min{χ ∈ RCard : H(χ) |= ϕ(a)}
(where RCard is the class of regular cardinals, and we define min ∅ = 0). Now let f :
RCard → RCard be defined by f(α) = sup{f ′(a, ϕ) : ϕ a formula, a ∈ H(α)}, and let
C = {δ ∈ Card : ∀α ∈ RCard ∩ δ f(α) < δ}.
(2) is also easy. –· ·✐2.5
Our main interest in this concept is its relativization to L. In this context we recall the
following fact:
2.6 Fact: Assume V = L. Then for all (regular) cardinals χ, H(χ) = Lχ. –· ·✐2.6
2.7 Fact: Assume P ∈ H(λ) is a forcing notion, χ > 22
λ
is regular. Then
13
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(1) For any P -name x˜ there is a P -name y˜ ∈ H(χ) such that ‖−P “x˜ ∈ H(χ) ⇒
x˜ = y˜”. (And conversely, if x˜ ∈ H(χ), then ‖−P “x˜ ∈ H(χ)”.)
(2) If x˜ ∈ H(χ), ϕ(·) a formula, then
‖− “H(χ) |= ϕ(x˜)” ⇔ “H(χ) |= ‘ ‖− ϕ(x˜)’ ”
Proof: (1) is by induction on the rank of x˜ in V
P , and (2) uses (1). –· ·✐2.7
2.8 Fact: Let P be a forcing notion, P ∈ H(λ), χ > 22
λ
regular. Then P is proper iff
H(χ) |= “P is proper”. –· ·✐2.8
2.9 Lemma: Assume that κ is reflecting, λ < κ is a regular cardinal, A and B are
structures in H(λ).
If there is a proper forcing notion P such that ‖−P “A ≃ B”, then there is such a (proper)
forcing notion in H(κ).
Proof: Fix P , and let χ be a large enough regular cardinal. So H(χ) |= “P proper, P ∈
H(µ),
(
22
µ)
exists”. Also, there is a P -name f˜ ∈ H(χ) such that ‖−P “H(χ) |= ‘f˜ : A→ B
is an isomorphism’ ”, so by 2.7(2), H(χ) |= “ ‖−P ‘f˜ : A→ B is an isomorphism’ ”.
Now we use the fact that κ is reflecting. We can find δ < κ, δ > λ and χ′ ∈ H(δ) such
that H(δ) |= “∃ν ∃Q ∈ H(ν), Q proper, ∃g˜ ‖−Q ‘g˜ : A→ B is an isomorphism’, and
(
22
ν)
exists.” So this Q is really proper, and Q forces that A and B are isomorphic. ⌣· ·✐2.9
2.10 Fact: If κ is reflecting, P ∈ H(κ) is a forcing notion, then ‖−P “κ is reflecting”.
Proof: Let P ∈ H(λ), λ < κ. Assume that p ‖− “H(χ) |= ‘ϕ(a˜)’, a˜ ∈ H(κ)”. We may
assume that a˜ ∈ H(κ). By 2.7 we have H(χ) |= “p ‖− ‘ϕ(a˜)’ ”, so there is a δ < κ, δ > λ,
such that H(δ) |= “p ‖− ‘ϕ(a˜)’ ”, hence p ‖− “H(δ) |= ‘ϕ(a˜)’ ”. δ is a cardinal in V
P ,
14
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because |P | < λ < δ. ⌣· ·✐2.10
2.11 Theorem: If “there is a reflecting cardinal” is consistent with ZFC, then also
PI(proper) (and hence BPFA, by 1.4) is consistent with ZFC.
Proof: (Short version) We will use an CS iteration of length κ, where κ reflects. All
intermediate forcing notions will have hereditary size < κ. By a bookkeeping argument
we can take care of all possible pairs of structures on ω1. If in the intermediate model
there is a proper forcing notion making two structures isomorphic, then there is such a
forcing notion of size < κ, so we continue. Note that once two structures have been made
isomorphic, they continue to stay isomorphic.
Proof: (More detailed version) Assume that κ reflects. We define a countable support
iteration (Pi, Qi : i < κ) of proper forcing notions and a sequence 〈M˜ i,N˜ i : i < κ〉 with
the following properties for all i < κ:
(1) Pi ∈ H(κ)
(2) Qi is a Pi-name, ‖−Pi “Qi is proper, Qi ∈ H(κ)”.
(3) ‖−Pi 2
ℵ1 < κ. (This follows from (1) and (2))
(4) M˜ i and N˜ i are names for structures on ω1.
(5) ‖−Pi “If M˜ i ≃proper, <κN˜ i, then ‖−Qi ‘M˜ i ≃ N˜ i’ ”.
With the usual bookkeeping argument we can also ensure that
(6) WheneverM˜ andN˜ are Pi-names for structures on ω1 for some i, then there are
unboundedly (or even stationarily) many j > i with ‖−j “M˜ j = M˜ , N˜ j = N˜ ”
From (1) we also get the following two properties:
(7) Pκ |= κ-cc
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(8) Whenever M˜ is a Pκ-name for a structure on ω1, then there are i < κ and a
Pi-name M˜
′ such that ‖−κ M˜ = M˜
′.
From these properties we can now show ‖−κ BPFA. Pκ is proper, so ω1 is not collapsed.
Let p be a condition, and let M˜ and N˜ be Pκ-names for structures on ω1, and assume that
p ‖−κ “Q˜ proper, ‖−Q˜
M˜ ≃ N˜ ”
where Q˜ is a Pκ-name. So by (8) we may assume that for some large enough i < κ M˜ and
N˜ are Pi-names. By (6) wlog we may assume that M˜ = M˜ i, N˜ = N˜ i. Now letting R be
the Pi-name (Pκ/Gi) ∗Q˜ , we get
p ‖−i “ ‖−R M˜ ≃ N˜ ”
But by 2.10, ‖−i “κ is reflecting”, so by the definition of Qi and by 2.9 we get that
p ‖−i+1 M˜ ≃ N˜ . ⌣· ·✐2.11
2.12 Remark: Since 2.8 is also true with “proper” replaced by “semiproper”, we similarly
get that the consistency of a Σ1-reflecting cardinal implies the consistency of the bounded
semiproper forcing axiom. ⌣· ·✐2.12
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3. Sealing the ω1-branches of a tree
In this section we will define a forcing notion which makes the set of branches of an ω1-tree
absolute.
3.1 Definition: Let T be a tree of height ω1. We say that B ⊆ T is an ω1-branch if B is
a maximal linearly ordered subset of T and has order type ω1.
3.2 Lemma: Let T be a tree of height ω1. Assume that every node of T is on some
ω1-branch, and that there are at uncountably many ω1-branches. (These assumptions are
just to simplify the notation). Then there is a proper forcing notion P ′T (in fact, P
′
T is a
composition of finitely many σ-closed and ccc forcing notions) forcing the following:
(1) T has ℵ1 many ω1-branches, i.e., there is a function b : ω1 ×ω1 → T such that
each set Bα = {b(α, β) : β < ω1} is a an end segment of of a branch of T
(enumerated in its natural order), and every ω1-branch is (modulo a countable
set) equal to one of the Bαs, and the sets Bα are pairwise disjoint.
(2) There is a function g : T → ω such that for all s < t in T , if g(s) = g(t) then
there is some (unique) α < ω1 such that {s, t} ⊆ Bα.
The proof consists of two parts. In the first part (3.3) we show that we may wlog assume
that T has actly ℵ1 many branches. This observation is a special case of a theorem of
Mitchell [Mi, 3.1].
In the second part we describe the forcing notion which works under the additional as-
sumption that T has only ℵ1 many branches. This forcing notion is esentially the same as
the one used by Baumgartner in [Ba2, section 8].
3.3 Fact: Let T be a tree of height ω1, κ > |T |, and let R1 be the forcing notion adding
17
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κ many Cohen reals. In V R1 , let R2 be a σ-closed focing notion. Then every branch of T
in V R1∗R2 is already in V R1 (and in fact already in V ).
Hence, taking R2 to be the Levy collapse of the number of branches of T to ℵ1 (with
countable conditions), T will have at most ℵ1 many branches in V
R1∗R2 .
Proof: Assume that b˜ is a name of a new branch. So the set
Tb˜ := {t ∈ T : ∃p ∈ R2 p ‖− t ∈ b˜}
is (in V R1) a perfect subtree of T . In particular, there is an order-preserving function
f : 2<ω → Tb˜. Since κ was chosen big enough, we can find a real c ∈ 2
ω ∩V R1 which is not
in V [f ]. Now note that T ′ is σ-closed, so there is t∗ ∈ T such that ∀n f(c↾n) ≤ t∗. But
this implies that
c =
⋃
{s ∈ 2<ω : f(s) ≤ t∗}
can be computed V [f ], a contradiction. ⌣· ·✐3.3
Now we describe a forcing notion P ′T which works under the assumption that T has not
more than ℵ1 branches. In the general case we can then use the forcing PT = R1 ∗R2 ∗P
′
T .
3.4 Definition: Let T be a tree of height ω1 with ℵ1 many ω1-branches {Bi : i < ω1} and
assume that each note of T is on some ω1-branch. Let B
′
j = Bj \
⋃
i<j Bi, xj = min(B
′
j) so
that the sets B′j are disjoint end segments of the branches Bj, and they form a partition
of T . Let A = {xi : i < ω1}.
The forcing “sealing the branches of T” is defined as
P ′T = {f : f a finite function from A to ω, and if x < y are in dom(f), then f(x) 6= f(y)}
3.5 Lemma: P ′T satisfies the countable chain condition. (In fact, much more is true: If
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〈pi : i < ω1〉 are conditions in P , then there are uncountable sets S1, S2 ⊆ ω1 such that
whenever i ∈ S1, j ∈ S2, then pi and pj are compatible. See [Sh f, XI])
Proof: Essentially the same as in [Ba2, 8.2]. –· ·✐3.5
To conclude the proof of 3.2, note that any generic filter G on P ′T induces a generic
fG : A → ω. Let gG : T → ω be defined by gG(y) = fG(xi) for all y ∈ Bi. This function
gG fulfills the requirement 3.2(2). ⌣· ·✐3.2
4. BPFA and reflecting cardinals are equiconsistent
In this section we will show that
4.1 Theorem: If BPFA holds, then the cardinal ℵ2 (computed in V ) is Σ1-reflecting in
L.
Before we start the proof of this theorem, we show some general properties of “sufficiently
generic” filters.
First a remark on terminology: When we consider BFA(P, λ), then by “for all sufficiently
generic G∗ ⊆ P , ϕ(G∗) holds” we mean: “there is a P -name f˜ : λ→ λ such that: whenever
a filter G∗ interprets f˜, then ϕ(G
∗) will hold”. A description of the name f˜ can always be
deduced from the context. Instead of a single name f˜ we usually have a family of λ many
names.
The first lemma shows that from any sufficiently generic filter we can correctly compute
the first order theory (that is, the part of it which is forced), or equivalently, the first order
diagram, of any small structure in the extension.
4.2 Lemma: Let P be a forcing notion, ‖−P “M is a structure with universe λ with λ
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many relations (R˜ i : i < λ)”. Assume BFA(P, λ). Then for every sufficiently generic filter
G∗ ⊆ P , letting M∗ = (λ,R˜ i[G
∗])i<λ, (where R˜ i[G
∗] := {(x1, . . . , xk) ∈ λ
n : ∃p ∈ G∗ p ‖−
M |= R˜ i(x1, . . . , xk)}) we have:
Whenever ϕ is a closed formula such that ‖−P M |= ϕ,
then M∗ |= ϕ.
Proof: Let χ be a large enough cardinal, and let N be an elementary submodel of H(χ) of
size λ containing all the necessary information (i.e., λ ⊆ N , (P,≤) ∈ N , (R˜ i : i < λ) ∈ N).
By BFA(P, λ) we can find a filter G∗ ⊆ P which decides all P -names of elements of M
which are in N and all first order statements about M, i.e.,
(1) For all α˜ ∈ N , if ‖−P “α˜ ∈ λ” then there is β ∈ λ and p ∈ G
∗ such that
p ‖−P “α˜ = βˇ”.
(2) For all α1, . . . , αk ∈ λ and all formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) there is p ∈ G
∗ such that
either p ‖− “M |= ϕ(α1, . . . , αk)” or p ‖− “M |= ¬ϕ(α1, . . . , αk)”.
We now claim that for every formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xk), for every a˜1, . . . , a˜k ∈ N : If ‖−P “M |=
ϕ(a˜1, . . . , a˜k)”, then M
∗ |= ϕ(a˜1[G
∗], . . . , a˜k[G
∗]). We assume that ϕ is in prefix form, so
in particular negation signs appear only before atomic formulas. The proof is by induction
on the complexity of ϕ, starting from atomic and negated atomic formulas. We will only
treat the case ϕ = ∃xϕ1. So assume that ‖−P M |= ∃xϕ1(x, a˜1, . . . , a˜k). We can find
a name b˜ ∈ N such that ‖−P M |= ϕ1(b˜, a˜1, . . . , a˜k), so by induction hypothesis we get
M∗ |= ϕ1(b˜[G
∗], a˜1[G
∗], . . . , a˜n[G
∗]). ⌣· ·✐4.2
4.3 Remark: In a sense the previous lemma characterizes “sufficiently generic” filters.
More precisely, the following is (trivially) true: Let P be a complete Boolean algebra, let
‖−P f˜ : λ → λ, and let M˜ = (λ, f˜), where we treat f˜ as a relation. For any ultrafilter
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G∗ ⊆ P the model M∗ = (λ, f˜[G
∗]) is well-defined. Since f˜ is forced to be a function,
we have ‖−P “M |= ‘∀α ∃β (α, β) ∈ f˜’ ”. Clearly G
∗ “decides” f˜ (as a function) iff M
∗
satisfies the same ∀∃ statement. ⌣· ·✐4.3
This last remark suggests the following easy characterization of BFA(P ):
4.4 Definition: Let P be an arbitrary forcing notion, not necessarily a complete Boolean
algebra. If f˜ is a P -name of a function from λ to λ, then let the “(forced) diagram” of
M˜ = (λ, f˜) be defined by
D‖−(M˜ ) = D
‖−(f˜) = {(ϕ, α1, . . . , αn) : ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) a first order formula, α1, . . . ,
αn ∈ λ, ‖−P ϕ(α1, . . . , αn) }
The “open (forced) diagram” D‖−qf (f˜) is defined similarly, but ϕ ranges only over quantifier-
free formulas.
4.5 Definition: For any forcing notion P let BFA′(P, λ) be the statement
BFA′(P, λ) = Whenever f˜ : λ→ λ is a P -name of a function, then there is a
function f∗ such that (λ, f∗) |= D‖−qf (f˜).
4.6 Fact: For any forcing notion P , BFA(P, λ) iff BFA′(P, λ).
Proof: BFA′(P, λ) is clearly equivalent to BFA′(ro(P ), λ). The same is true (by definition)
for BFA. So we may wlog assume that P is a complete Boolean Algebra. It is clear that
BFA(P, λ)⇒ BFA′(P, λ).
Conversely, if f∗ is a function as in BFA′, then the we claim that the set {[[f˜(α) = f
∗(α)]] :
α ∈ λ} generates a filter on P (where [[ϕ]] denotes the Boolean value of a closed statement
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ϕ). Proof of this claim: If not, then there are ordinals α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βn such that
f∗(α1) = β1 & · · · & f
∗(αn) = βn
but the Boolean value
[[f˜(α1) = β1 & · · · & f˜(αn) = βn]]
is 0. This is a contradiction to the fact that f∗ witnesses BFA′(P, λ). ⌣· ·✐4.6
After this digression we now continue our preparatory work for the proof of theorem 4.1.
Our next lemma shows that a generic filter will not only reflect first order statements about
small structures, but will also preserve their wellfoundedness.
4.7 Lemma: Assume that ‖−P “M˜ = (λ,E˜ ) is a well-founded structure, λ is a cardinal”.
Assume that cf (λ) > ω, and assume that BFA(P, λ) holds. Then for every sufficiently
generic filter G∗ ⊆ P we have that M∗ := (λ,E˜ [G
∗]) is well-founded.
(We will use this lemma only for the case where P is proper and λ = ω1.)
Proof: For each α < λ let r˜α be the name of the canonical rank function on (α,E˜ ), i.e.,
‖−P “dom(r˜α) = α, ∀β < α r˜α(β) = sup{r˜α(γ) + 1 : γEβ}”
As ‖−P “λ is a cardinal”, we have ‖−P “rng(r˜α) ⊆ λ”, so any sufficiently generic filter G
∗
will interpret all the functions r˜α. Applying lemma 4.2 to the structure (α,E˜ [G
∗], r˜α[G
∗])
we see that r˜α[G
∗] is indeed a rank function witnessing that (α,E˜ [G
∗]) is well-founded.
Since cf (λ) > ω this now implies that also (λ,E˜ [G
∗]) is well-founded. ⌣· ·✐4.7
We now start the proof of 4.1. The definitions in the following paragraphs will be valid
throughout this section.
Assume BPFA. Let κ := ℵ2. We will show that κ is reflecting in L. It is clear that κ is
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regular in L.
4.8 Claim: Without loss of generality we may assume:
(1) 0# does not exist, i.e., the covering lemma holds for L.
(2) ℵℵ12 = ℵ2.
(3) There is A ⊆ ℵ2 such that whenever X ⊆ Ord is of size ≤ ℵ1, then X ∈ L[A].
Proof: (1) If 0# exists, then Lκ ≺ L, and it is easy to see that this implies that κ is a
reflecting cardinal in L.
(2) Let P = Levy(ℵ2,ℵ
ℵ1
2 ), i.e., members of P are partial functions from ℵ2 to ℵ
ℵ1
2 with
bounded domain. Since P does not add new subsets of ℵ1 and P is proper, also V
P will
satisfy PI(proper,ℵ1). Also ℵ
V
2 = ℵ
V P
2 and V
P |= ℵℵ12 = ℵ2, so we can wlog work in V
P
instead of V .
(3) By (2) we can find a set A ⊆ ℵ2 such that ℵ
L[A]
2 = ℵ2 and every function from ℵ1 to
ℵ2 is already in L[A]. By (1), every set X of ordinals of size ≤ ℵ1 can be covered by a set
Y ∈ L, |Y | = ℵ1. Let j : Y → otp(Y ) be order preseving, then j[X ] ∈ L[A], j ∈ L, so
X ∈ L[A]. ⌣· ·✐4.8
Proof of 4.1: Let ϕ(x) be a formula, a ∈ Lκ, and assume that χ > κ, Lχ |= ϕ(a), χ
a regular cardinal in L. We have to find an L-cardinal χ′ < κ such that a ∈ Lχ′ and
Lχ′ |= ϕ(a).
By 2.3, we may assume that χ is a cardinal in L[A] or even in V .
Informal outline of the proof: We will define a forcing notion P . In V P we will construct
a model M = (M,∈, χ, x, . . .) ≺ V P of size ℵ1 containing all necessary information. This
model has an isomorphic copy M¯ with underlying set ω1. We will find a “sufficiently
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generic” filter G∗ which will “interpret” M¯ as M∗. By 4.7 we may assume that M∗ =
(ω1, E
∗, χ∗ . . .) will be well-founded, so we can form its transitive collapse M′ = (M ′,∈
, χ′, . . .). By 4.2 we have thatM′ |= “χ′ is a cardinal in L”, i.e., χ′ is a cardinal in LM ′∩Ord.
The main point will be to show that any filter on our forcing notion P will code enough
information to enable us to conclude that χ′ is really a cardinal of L.
4.9 Definition of the forcing notions Q0 and Q1: Let Q0 be the Levy-collapse of Lχ[A]
to ℵ1, i.e. the set of countable partial functions from ω1 to Lχ[A] ordered by extension.
In V Q0 let T be the following tree: Elements of T are of the form
(〈µi : i < α〉, 〈fij : i ≤ j < α〉)
(we will usually write them as 〈µi, fij : i ≤ j < α〉), where the µi are ordinals < χ, the fij
are a system of commuting order-preserving embeddings, and α < ω1. T is ordered by the
relation “is an initial segment of”.
If B is a branch of T (in V Q0 , or in any bigger universe) of length δ then B defines a
directed system 〈µi, fij : i ≤ j < δ〉 of well-orders. We will call the direct limit of this
system (γB, <B). In general this may not be a well-order, but it is clear that if the length
of B is ω1, then (γB, <B) will be a well-order.
Let Q1 = PT be the forcing “sealing the ω1-branches of T” described in 3.2. We let
P = Q0 ∗ Q1. So P is a proper order, in fact it is a finite iteration of σ-closed and ccc
partial orderings.
4.10 Definition: In V P we define a model M as follows: Let Ω a large enough regular
cardinal of V . Let (M,∈) be an elementary submodel of (H(Ω)V
P
,∈) of size ℵ1 containing
all necessary information, in particular M ⊇ Lχ[A]. We now expand (M,∈) to a model
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M = (M,∈, χ, A, . . .) by adding the following functions, relations and constants:
- a constant for each element of Lξ (where ξ is chosen such that a ∈ Lξ)
- relations M0 and M1 which are interpreted as M ∩H(Ω)
V and M ∩H(Ω)V
Q0
,
respectively.
- constants χ, A, κ, T , g, b (b is the function enumerating the branches of T
from 3.2, and g is the specializing function g : T → ω also from 3.2)
- a function c : χ × ω1 → χ such that for all δ < χ: If cf (δ) = ℵ1, then
c(δ, ·) : ω1 → δ is increasing and cofinal in δ.
Since M , the underlying set of M, is of cardinality ℵ1, we can find an isomorphic model
M¯ = (ω1, E¯, χ¯, . . .)
In V we have names for all the above: M¯˜ , E¯˜ , etc. Now let G
∗ be a sufficiently generic
filter, i.e., G∗ will interpret all these names. Writing E∗ for E¯˜ [G
∗], etc., and letting
M∗ = (ω1, E
∗, χ∗, . . .), we may by 4.7 and 4.2 assume that the following holds:
4.11 Fact:
(1) (ω1, E
∗) is well-founded.
(2) If ψ is a closed formula such that ‖−P “M |= ψ”, then M
∗ |= ψ.
4.12 Main definition: We let
M
′ = (M ′,∈, χ′, . . .)
be the Mostowski collapse of M∗. This is possible by 4.11(1). M′0 = (M
′
0,∈) and M
′
1 =
(M ′1,∈) will be “inner models” of M
′.
Note: We will now do several computations and absoluteness arguments involving the
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universes V , L[A′], M′, L[A′]M
′
= LM ′∩Ord[A
′], etc. By default, all set-theoretic func-
tions, quantifiers, etc., are to be interpreted in V , but we will often also have to con-
sider relativized notions, like M′ |= “L[A′] |= ‘ . . .’ ” (which is of course equivalent to
LM ′∩Ord[A] |= ‘ . . .’), or cf
L[A′], etc.
Note that M′ |= “L[A′] |= ‘κ′ = ℵ2’ ”, so we get ℵ
M
′
1 = ℵ
V
1 .
We will finish the proof of 4.1 with the following two lemmas:
4.13 Lemma: a ∈ Lχ′ , Lχ′ ⊆M
′ and Lχ′ |= ϕ(a).
4.14 Lemma: L |= χ′ is a cardinal.
Proof of 4.13: Since χ′ + 1 ⊆ M ′ and M′ satisfies a large fragment of ZFC, we have
Lχ′ ⊆ M
′ and Lχ′ ∈ M
′. For each y ∈ Lξ let cy be the associated constant symbol,
then by induction (using 4.11(2)) it is easy to show that y = cM
′
y for all y ∈ Lξ. Since
‖−P “M |= [Lχ |= ‘ϕ(a)’]”, we thus have M
′ |= “Lχ′ |= ‘ϕ(a)’ ”. But Lχ′ ⊆ M
′, so
Lχ′ |= ϕ(a). ⌣· ·✐4.13
So we are left with proving 4.14. In L[A′] let µ be the cardinality of χ′, and (again in
L[A′]) let ν be the successor of µ. We will prove 4.14 by showing the following fact:
4.15 Lemma: ν ⊆M ′.
Proof of 4.14(using 4.15): In fact we show that 4.15 implies that χ′ is a cardinal even
in L[A′]: If not, then µ < χ′, and since ν is a cardinal in L[A′] we can find a γ < ν
such that Lγ [A
′] |=“there is a function from µ onto χ′”. By 4.15, γ ∈ M ′, so by the
well-known absoluteness properties of L we have Lγ [A
′] ⊆ M ′, so M′ |= “L[A′] |= ‘χ′ is
not a cardinal.’ ” But we also have ‖−P M |= “L[A] |= ‘χ IS a cardinal’ ”, so we get a
contradiction to 4.11(2). ⌣· ·✐4.14
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Proof of 4.15: We will distinguish two cases, according to what the cofinality of µ is.
Case 1: cf (µ) = ℵ0. (This is the “easy” case, for which we do not need to know anything
about the forcing Q1 other than that it is proper, so the class {δ : cf (δ) = ℵ0} is the same
in V , V Q0 , V P , L[A]). We start our investigation of case 1 with the following remark:
4.16 Fact:
(1) For all δ: If cf L[A](δ) > ℵ0, then cf (δ) > ℵ0.
(2) ‖−P “For all δ < χ :If cf
L[A](δ) > ℵ0, then cf (δ) = ℵ1”.
(3) If M′ |= cf L[A
′](µ) > ℵ0, then M
′ |= cf (µ) = ℵ1.
(4) If M′ |= “cf (µ) = ℵ1”, then cf (µ) = ℵ1.
Proof: (1): By the choice of A. (4.8(3)).
(2): Use (1) and the fact that P is proper, hence does not cover old uncountable sets by
new countable sets.
(3): Use (2) and 4.2.
(4): If M′ |= “cf (µ) = ℵ1”, then the function c
′(µ, ·) is increasing and cofinal in µ. (Recall
that ωV1 = ω
M
′
1 ) ⌣· ·✐4.16
4.17 Conclusion: Since cf (µ) = ℵ0, we get from (3) and (4): M
′ |= “L[A′] |= ‘cf (µ) =
ℵ0’ ”.
Let M′ |= “ν1 is the L[A
′]-successor of µ.” We will show that ν1 = ν. This suffices, because
M ′ is transitive.
So assume that ν1 < ν. Working in L[A
′] we have
∣∣[µ]ℵ0∣∣ = ν and |Lν1 [A′]| < ν, so we can
find a y ∈ [µ]ℵ0 , y ∈ Lγ [A
′]\Lν1[A
′] for some γ < ν. Working in V , let Lγ [A
′] =
⋃
i<ω1
Xi,
where 〈Xi : i < ω1〉 is a continuous increasing chain of elementary countable submodels of
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Lγ [A
′], with y, A′ ∈ X0. In M
′
1 = (M
′
1,∈) we can find a continuous increasing sequence
〈Yi : i < ω1〉 of countable elementary submodels of Lµ[A
′] with
⋃
i<ω1
Yi = Lµ[A
′] and
A′ ∈ Y0. We can find an i such that Xi ∩ Lµ[A
′] = Yi.
Let j : (Xi,∈, A, Yi)→ (Lγˆ [Aˆ],∈, Aˆ, Lµˆ[Aˆ]) be the collapsing isomorphism.
Now note that Yi = Xi∩Lµ[A
′] is a transitive subset ofXi, so j↾Yi is exactly the Mostowski
collapse of (Yi,∈), so j↾Yi ∈ M
′
1 and Aˆ ∈ M
′
1. Hence also j(y) ∈ Lγˆ [Aˆ] ⊆ M
′
1, so we can
compute
y = {α : (j↾Yi)(α) ∈ j(y)}
in M′1. Hence y ∈ M
′
1. But M
′ |= “[µ]ℵ0 ∩ M ′1 = [µ]
ℵ0 ∩ M ′0 = [µ]
ℵ0 ∩ L[A′]” (the
first equality holds because Q0 is a σ-closed forcing notion, the second because of our
assumption 4.8(3))
Hence M′ |= y ∈ L[A′], so M′ |= y ∈ Lν1 [A
′], a contradiction to our choice of ν.
⌣· ·✐4.15 Case 1
Case 2: cf (µ) = ℵ1. Let γ < ν. We have to show that γ ∈ M
′. Since L[A′] |= |γ| = µ,
we can in L[A′] find an increasing sequence 〈Aξ : ξ < µ〉, γ =
⋃
ξ<µAξ, where each Aξ
has (in L[A′]) cardinality < µ. Let αξ be the order type of Aξ, then the inclusion map
from Aξ into Aζ naturally induces an order preserving function fξζ : αξ → αζ . Let
B = 〈αξ, fξζ : ξ ≤ ζ < µ〉, and write B↾β for 〈αξ, fξζ : ξ ≤ ζ < β〉. Clearly the direct limit
of this system is a well-ordered set of order type γ.
So B is in L[A′], but we can moreover show that each initial segment B↾β is already in
Lµ[A
′]. This follows from the fact that each such initial segment can be canonically coded
by a bounded subset of µ.
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Since Lµ[A
′] ⊆ Lχ′ [A
′] ⊆ M ′1, we know that B↾β is in M
′
1 for all β < µ. In M
′
1 let
〈ξi : i < ω1〉 be an increasing cofinal subsequence of µ. Let βi = αξi , hij = fξi,ξj . Note
that the direct limit of the system 〈βi, hij ; i ≤ j < ω1〉 is still a well-ordered set of order
type γ.
So for each δ < ω1 we know that the sequence bδ := 〈βi, fij : i ≤ j ≤ δ〉 is in M
′
1, and
M′1 |= bδ ∈ T
′.
Now we can (in V ) find an uncountable set C ⊆ ω1 and a natural number n such that forall
δ ∈ C we have g′(bδ) = n. Now recall the characteristic property of g (see 3.2) and hence
of g′ (by 4.11): for each δ1 < δ2 in C we have a unique branch B
′
α = {b
′(α, β) : β < ω1}
with {bδ1 , bδ2} ⊆ Bα. A priori this α depends on δ1 and δ2, but since Bα ∩ Bβ = ∅ for
α 6= β we must have the same α for all δ ∈ C.
So the sequence 〈bδ : δ ∈ C〉 is cofinal on some branch B
′
α which is in M
′. So we get that γ,
the order type of the limit of this system, is also inM ′. ⌣· ·✐4.15 Case 2 ⌣· ·✐4.1 ⌣· ·✐[GoSh 507]
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